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PERMANENT AND TRANSITORY WAGE INEQUALITY 
OF BRITISH MEN, 1975-2001: 
YEAR, AGE AND COHORT EFFECTS ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the variance-covariance structure of log-wages over time and over the lifecycle of 
British men from 1975 to 2001, hereby controlling for cohort effects. Wage inequality has risen 
sharply during the 1980’s and early 1990’s and remained fairly constant in the second half of the 
1990’s. We show that this increase is caused mainly by a strong increase in transitory wage 
inequality and only to a lesser extent to an increase in permanent wage inequality. The transitory 
component of log-wages is, however, highly persistent over time: serial correlation decreases from 
0.88 over a one-year period to 0.65 over a ten-year period. The constant wage inequality in the 
second half of the 1990’s is attributed to a slight decrease in permanent wages inequality, a 
stabilization of the variance of the transitory wage shock, and the strong decrease in transitory wage 
inequality for the cohorts entering employment since the end of the 1980’s. Ignoring age effects in 
transitory wage inequality and cohort effects, as is commonly done, leads to severely distorted 
inferences concerning the changes in permanent wage inequality. 
 
Keywords: Panel Data, Wage Distribution, Inequality, Mobility. 
JEL codes: C23, D31, J31, J60 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
One of the striking features of the British labour market from the mid 1970’s onwards is the strong 
increase in wage inequality. Gosling et al. (2000) report that the gap between the 10th and 90th 
percentile of the wage distribution changed little during the 1960’s and early 1970’s and has widened 
rapidly throughout the 1980’s and early 1990’s. Dickens (2000a) reports a doubling of the variance 
of the logarithm of hourly wages from 1975 to 1995. Ramos (2003), using the 1991-1999 British 
Household Panel Study, shows relative stable earnings inequality from 1994 to 1997, a decrease 
from 1997 to 1998 and a sharp increase from 1998 to 1999. In contrast, Gosling and Lemieux 
(2001), using the Family Expenditure Survey and Labour Force Survey, report that wage inequality in 
the U.K. remained relatively stable throughout the second half of the 1990’s. In these respects the 
British labour market shows trends similar to the U.S. labour market (Katz and Autor, 2000, Gosling 
and Lemieux, 2001). Other industrialised countries have experienced similar changes in the wage 
distribution over the last decades but the increase in wage inequality over time is much less 
pronounced than in Britain and the U.S. or even absent during the 1980’s for countries such as 
(West) Germany. A cross-country comparison of wage inequality can be found in Gottschalk and 
Smeeding (1997), Katz and Autor (2000) and Acemoglu (2002).1  
 
Disentangling variances of the permanent and transitory wage components plays a key role in 
understanding the changes in the wage distribution over time (Lillard and Willis, 1978, Gottschalk, 
1982, Atkinson et al., 1992, Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994, Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2002, Cappellari, 
2003). For instance, the relative importance of the permanent wage component is closely related to 
the earnings mobility of individuals; defined as the probability individuals change ranks within the 
wage distribution. Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995) show that in a canonical permanent-transitory (log-
) earnings component model, and under normality assumptions, wage mobility depends solely on the 
ratio of the variance of the permanent component of wages and total wage variation: an increase in 
the ratio results in a decrease in wage mobility.2
 
All pioneering studies mentioned above employ U.S. data but more recently empirical evidence has 
been gathered for Britain. Blundell and Preston (1996, 1998) use the British Family Expenditure 
                                                  
1   Gottschalk and Joyce (1998), Snower (1999) and Katz and Autor (2000) provide excellent discussions on the possible 
explanations suggested in the literature for this rise in inequality, such as skill biased technological change, and the 
different patterns of earnings inequality over time across countries. 
2   Methods of analysing earnings mobility more explicitly using other econometric techniques, such as transition models, 
are discussed in Sloane and Theodossiou (1996), Jarvis and Jenkins (1998), Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) and Dickens 
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Survey (FES) for this purpose. Since the FES is not a panel, they have to rely on other information to 
separately identify the growth in the variances of permanent and transitory income shocks. They use 
consumption data for this purpose. In doing so, they exploit the fact that an increase in the short-
run variation of transitory income does not affect lifecycle income, hence the consumption of 
households.3  A sufficient condition for this to be true is that the Permanent-Income Hypothesis 
holds. They conclude that there has been a strong growth in transitory income inequality in the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s, while younger cohorts appear to face higher levels of permanent income 
inequality. Dickens (2000a), using the New Earnings Survey (NES), builds on the models proposed by 
MaCurdy (1982) and Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995). He concludes that the variance of the 
permanent component of wages has risen in the early 1980’s and the variance of the transitory 
component of wages has risen in the late 1980’s, each explaining about half of the rise in wage 
inequality in Britain over the period 1975-1995. Ramos (2003), using the British Household Panel 
Study and a model in the spirit of Baker and Solon (2003), concludes that earnings persistence has 
fallen and, consequently, mobility has increased over the period 1991-1999. 
 
The main objective of this study is to examine the changes in the variances of the transitory and 
permanent components of the logarithm of gross hourly wages of British men over the years 1975-
2001. For this purpose we use the New Earnings Survey, which is the same data used by Dickens 
(2000a). This study contributes significantly to the literature from both an empirical and a 
methodological perspective in the following way: We examine the change in wage inequality in 
Britain up to 2001. The fact we have recent data is particularly interesting because the rise in wage 
inequality appears to have come to a halt in the second half of the 1990’s. By means of the minimum 
distance method, we estimate several econometric models developed in the literature so far for 
analysing the variance-covariance structure of wages; among those models that are very similar to 
the ones used by Dickens (2000a) and Moffitt and Gottschalk (2002). All of these models do not 
pass a goodness-of-fit test for model misspecification. For this reason, the previous models are 
extended in two directions. Firstly, we allow for transitory shocks to affect individual wages 
differently at different ages. This makes it possible to examine transitory and permanent wage 
inequality over individuals’ lifecycle. Secondly, we follow the suggestion of Blundell and Preston 
(1996, 1998) and Baker and Solon (2003) and allow wage inequality to vary by cohort. These two 
extensions turn out to be crucial for obtaining a model that passes the test for model 
misspecification and obtaining consistent parameter estimates. 
                                                                                                                                                      
(2000b). Atkinson et al. (1992) provides an overview of many of these techniques and excellent discussions on 
inequality and mobility. 
3   See also Attanasio, Berloffa, Blundell and Preston (2002). 
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The outline of this paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the data. Model selection takes place in 
Section 3. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results of the preferred model. Section 5 
concludes. 
2 THE NEW EARNINGS SURVEY 1975-2001 
The New Earnings Survey (NES) is an annual cross-section survey of individual employees on 
earnings and hours of work of employees in employment in Great Britain. The employers supply the 
information and the data is gathered by National Statistics. All employees in employment in Great 
Britain who have a National Insurance (NI) number that ends with a specified pair of digits form the 
sample. The NI number is issued randomly to each individual over the age of 16 and the sampling 
frame for the Survey is a 1% random sample of all employees. Since in every year the same pair of 
terminating digits of the NI number is used as the basis for each year's sample, one can easily 
generate an unbalanced panel from the annual cross-section surveys. The panel is characterised by 
new cohorts entering the sample when starting employment and older cohorts exiting because of 
retirement. In this study the panel covers the period 1975-2001. 
 
The sample contains information on the individual’s gross weekly pay, including overtime pay, 
measured in April of each year. Furthermore, this study uses the information collected on the 
employee’s hours of work, age and gender. As is most often the case with administrative data, the 
NES has little information on individual characteristics and no information on household 
characteristics. There is information on the individuals’ occupational classification of the job and 
industrial classification of the firm at which employed.4  However, important human capital variables 
such as the educational attainment or work experience are not in the data.  
 
2.1 DATA SELECTION 
The raw unbalanced panel consists of about half a million individuals from 1975 up to 2001 resulting 
in about 4.4 million observations.  In line with Dickens (2000a), we exclude in the empirical analysis 
earnings that have been affected by sickness, absence, short-time working or employment starting 
within the recording period 5 (9.4% of the observations) and earnings of multiple jobholders (1.3%). 
In addition, 3.6% of the observations record a missing value for the variable that identifies an 
employee with multiple jobs and these are also excluded from the sample. About 7% record a 
                                                  
4   Prasad (2002), who also uses NES data, concludes that changes over the last two decades in the structure of 
employment (based on industry and occupation) did not have a dominant effect on the wage structure. Most of the 
increase in the variation of (log-) earnings is due to an increase in within group wage inequality. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 
(1993) report a similar finding for the U.S. 
5   The recording period varies from one week to one month. This information is not available. National Statistics uses this 
information to calculate hourly and weekly earnings, which are variables in the available NES. 
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missing value on either earnings or on hours of work. As mentioned above, the Survey contains no 
information on individual’s educational attainment or on household characteristics such as marital 
status or the presence of children. This makes it impossible to control for possible sample selection 
issues. This is in particular of importance for the female wage distribution and for this reason the 
empirical analysis is confined to male employees (57%). We select men aged 21-59 years in any year 
(87% of the male employees).6 To ensure robustness of the results we exclude individuals in the top 
and bottom 0.1% of the wage distribution (this excludes on average 120 observations per year). The 
final sample used in the empirical analysis comprises on average around 66,000 men in any year, in 
total 1,77 million observations over 219,495 individuals from 1975 up to 2001.  
 
2.2 PANEL ATTRITION 
The NES has not been designed for the purpose of constructing a panel and is mostly used as a 
series of representative cross sections by National Statistics. As mentioned above, the fact that the 
NI number is used to sample individuals makes it possible to construct the panel. At the stage of the 
data gathering process little attention is paid to the panel aspect of the survey and possible selection 
problems may arise from sample attrition in the NES. The discussion on this underneath is based on 
Dickens (2000a). 
 
Only those who are in employment enter the sample and therefore absence from the panel can 
occur because individuals retire, become unemployed or inactive. Absence from the panel while 
being employed is a major concern for this study and can occur for two main reasons. The first is 
related to the way the data are gathered. Some responses are obtained directly from large public 
and private organizations that use their computerised administrative databases for this purpose, and 
these are directly contacted.7 The largest share of the employers (about 75%) is contacted through 
the Inland Revenue tax register using current Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) records and a questionnaire 
is sent to complete by the employer. To be registered on the PAYE tax record the individual’s 
earnings has to exceed a tax threshold. For example, the threshold is about 80 pounds in 1998, 
which is 22 hours of work at minimum wage. In the empirical investigation we use men aged 21-59 
and we believe the results for this group are unlikely to be affected by this threshold. The second 
main reason for absence is the time in between locating the employer of the individual and when the 
employer receives the questionnaire. This period between the sampling and actually data gathering 
                                                  
6   Here we deviate slightly from the selection of Dickens (2000a), using NES 1975-1995, who selects men aged 22-54 and 
born between 1921 and 1968. 
7   This method of tracing individuals was introduced in 1981 and initially accounted for only a small fraction of employees 
in the NES. However, by 1983, this method of data collection has been extended considerably so that for 25% of the 
employees the information is obtained directly from the employer. This proportion of 25% remained fairly constant in 
subsequent years (see Dickens, 2000a). 
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can be about one month and consequently an employee may have disappeared from the employers’ 
pay roll if this employee has changed jobs during this time. Thus employees with high rates of job 
turnover are likely to be under represented in the sample. Consequently, the NES may overstate 
the permanent component of earnings since individuals with more transitory income, unstable 
employment patterns, are less likely to be in the sample (see Dickens, 2000a, for more details). 
Obviously, this kind of attrition is endogenous in the sense that it biases the results towards a higher 
degree of persistency of earnings shocks. Also, since we are interested in changes over time, over 
time National Statistics has tried to improve her procedure to trace individuals. Hence this may as 
well have affected the time trend in the ratio between transitory and permanent wage inequality. 
This ratio may also have changed over time because an increasing number of firms having a fully 
computerized salary administration and returning the necessary information with relatively little 
effort and high accuracy. We do not have the information to control for this, if there is indeed 
endogenous selection, and a therefore necessary assumption made throughout the paper is that 
sample attrition is exogenous. Arguably, the unbalanced panel used in this study may suffer from far 
less endogenous selection than many of the previous U.S. studies using a balanced panel of PSID data 
over periods up to 20 years (for example Baker, 1997). 
 
The advantages of using the NES need to be stressed as well. The consistency of the questionnaire 
over time and the ability to follow so many employees, on average 164.000 per year, for up to 27 
years is unique for micro-data. The questionnaires are sent to the employers and not to the 
employees and the employers are under a legal obligation to complete the questionnaire (Statistics 
of Trade Act 1947), which ensures a high response rate. The data is provided from payroll records, 
giving a very high degree of accuracy in the earnings information. For instance, the variance of log-
earnings based on the British Household Panel Study (Ramos, 2003) is about four times the variance 
of log-earnings based on the NES8. There might be some definitional differences but it is most likely 
that much of this difference is due to differences in the variances of the measurement error in 
earnings. Moreover, if an individual is not included in the Survey in any year, for example due to 
unemployment, the sampling frame ensures that the employee should be located for the Survey in 
any future year when in employment. Consequently, absences from the survey or failures of sample 
location do not lead to cumulative attrition. 
 
2.3 THE VARIANCE-COVARIANCE MATRIX OF LOG-WAGES 
We follow Abowd and Card (1989), Baker and Solon (2003) and Dickens (2000a) to compute the 
variance-covariance matrix of the logarithm of hourly gross earnings (referred to as log-wages from 
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here onwards). Let yibt denote the log-wage of individual i in year t and who is born in year b, and let 
dibt denote a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i, born in year b, is present in the sample in year 
t, and 0 otherwise. We construct the variance-covariance matrix by birth-cohort. The number of 
individuals in the panel born in year b is denoted by nb and tb denotes the length of the panel for 
birth-cohort b, i.e. the number of periods of observation. As discussed above, the sample consists of 
men aged 21-59 over the period 1975-2001, hence the oldest birth-cohort is 1916 and the youngest 
birth-cohort is 1980. The elements of the variance-covariance matrix mb, a (tbxtb)-matrix, for each 
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For the oldest birth-cohort 1916 we only have one wage observation in 1975 (tb=1), for the 1917 
birth-cohort we have two observations (1975 and 1976, tb=2) and so forth, up to birth-cohort 1941 
for which we have 26 observations (1975-2000, tb=26). For the birth-cohorts 1942 up to and 
                                                                                                                                                      
8   Here we used our own sample, which contains information on gross weekly pay. Details are available upon request. 
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including 1954 we have 27 observations, i.e. 13 birth-cohorts we observe over the entire sample 
period (1975-2001, tb=27). For the birth-cohort of 1955 we have 26 observations (tb=26), and so 
forth, up to the youngest birth-cohort of 1980 for which we have one observation (2001, tb=1). As 
mentioned above, for each birth-cohort we have  ( ) 1 2
1 + b b t t  distinct elements. The total number of 








b b t t n ) , and is equal to 11466.9 Table 1 reports on 
the number of observations on which the elements of the variance-covariance matrix of log-wages 
are based. The element based on the lowest number of observations turns out to be the covariance 
between the log-wages in 1975 and 2001 for individuals born in 1941 and is based on only 441 
observations. As Table 1 shows, most distinct elements are based on more than 1000 observations. 
Table 1: The frequency distribution of the number individual observations on which the distinct elements of the 
variance-covariance matrix of log-wages is based. 
Number of Observations  <500   500-1000  1000-1500  1500-2000  ≥2000 
Number of distinct elements  53  3562  6763  960  128 
Percentage of distinct elements  0.5%  31.1%  59.0%  8.4%  1.1% 
 
 
2.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 2 reports on the basic descriptive statistics for selected years. The hourly wage rate is defined 
as standard gross hourly earnings including overtime payments. Wages are in 2001 £s, with deflation 
by the Retail Price Index. The measures that we use for wage inequality are the variance of the log-
wage and the ratio of the 90th and 10th percentile of the wage distribution. As reported in Dickens 
(2000a), Table 2 shows a strong increase in wage inequality over time from 1975/1980 to 1995 and 
hereafter wage inequality has remained fairly constant (see also Figure 2). Figure 1 shows for 
different year-of-birth-cohorts the increase in wage inequality by age. In contrast with Table 2, 
Figure 1 does not clearly show a constant wage inequality in the later years of observation, hence 
during the second half of the 1990’s. This suggests that the stabilisation of wage inequality in the 
second half of the 1990’s may be due to a compositional effect. The general picture that emerges 
from Figure 1 is that the variance of log-wages increases with age and that in particular the new 
entrants in the labour force appear to experience a larger variance of log-wages. 
                                                  











b b t t n . 
AIAS - UvA   7 Adriaan S. Kalwij & Rob Alessie 
 
Table 2: Number of Observations and Descriptive Statistics for Selective Years. 
  1975  1980  1985 1990 1995 2000 
Number  of  Observations  66355  69472  62464 66254 66229 62433 
Average  Age  39.8  39.6  38.8 38.5 38.5 39.5 
          
Hourly Wage Rate (2001£)     
Average  7.78  7.91  8.80 10.0 10.8 11.7 
Standard  deviation  3.28  3.45  4.38 5.75 6.98 7.8 
Percentiles          
5%  4.43  4.34  4.35 4.54 4.36 4.74 
10%  4.88  4.80  4.89 5.15 5.05 5.42 
50%  6.96  7.02  7.65 8.45 8.92 9.56 
90%  11.6  12.0  14.0 16.5 18.4 19.9 
95%  14.2  14.6  17.1 20.5 23.0 25.4 
          
90
th/10
th  deciles  2.38  2.50  2.86 3.00 3.64 3.67 
          
Variance  of  log-wage  0.12  0.13  0.16 0.20 0.25 0.24 
Average  log-wage  1.98  1.99  2.08 2.18 2.23 2.31 
 
 
Figure 1: Variances of log-wage with age, by birth-cohort. 
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Figure 2 shows the variance-covariance structure of log-wages over time. The covariances, at all 
orders, show a similar time pattern as the variance. More importantly, the lines are parallel and at a 
rather stable equal distance over time, which may be because of a stable error structure of wages 
over time. As a consequence, the correlations over time are remarkable stable over time (Figure 3) 
although a formal test10 would reject the null hypothesis of time constant correlations. The 
correlation structure is remarkable similar to those reported in the U.S. literature discussed in the 
introduction (e.g. Abowd and Card, 1989). The correlations and covariances of log-wages decrease 
with the order at a decreasing rate and appear to converge to a positive level of covariance, which 
suggests presence of a permanent component in the variance of log-wages. 
 
Figure 2: Variance-covariances of log-wages. 
 
 
                                                  
10   Tests have been carried out as suggested by MaCurdy (1982) to obtain a first impression of the data. 
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Figure 3: Correlations between two periods of log-wages. 
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3 MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION 
Section 3.1 discusses the estimation and testing procedures. Section 3.2 reviews the different 
econometric models used in the literature for analysing the variance-covariance structure of wages 
and extends these by allowing for cohort effects.  
 
3.1 MODEL ESTIMATION AND SPECIFICATION TEST 
The main objective of the empirical analysis is to model the stochastic process that generates the 
observed variance-covariance structure of the logarithm of individuals’ wage rates. The estimation 
procedure described underneath closely follows Abowd and Card (1989) and Dickens (2000a). We 
employ a Minimum Distance Estimator to fit a specific specification of the variance-covariance 
structure of wages, say f(b), to the actual observed structure m, section 2.3): 
   [] [ ] ) ( ) ( min arg ˆ b f m A b f m b
T
b
− − = , 
where b is a (kx1)-vector containing the parameters of interest, b is its Minimum Distance estimate 
and A is an appropriate weighting matrix. Chamberlain (1984) shows that the optimal weighting 
matrix is V
ˆ
-1, where V is the variance-covariance matrix of m as defined in section 2.3. Altonji and 
Segal (1996) examine the small sample properties of the Minimum Distance Estimator. On basis of a 
simulation study they conclude that the Optimal Weighted Minimum Distance (OMWD) estimates 
suffer from a serious finite sample bias due to correlation between the sampling errors in m and V 
and strongly suggest using Equally Weighted Minimum Distance. We follow their suggestion, as do 
most recent empirical studies in this area, and use the Equally Weighted Minimum Distance   
(EWMD) estimator. In case of the EWMD estimator the weighting matrix A is equal to the identity 





= AG G AVAG G AG G b V
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A   g o o d n e s s  o f  f i t  t e s t  i s  u s e d  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  a  s p e c i f i c  m o d e l    in 
explaining the observed variance-covariance structure of (log-) wages. This test statistic for model 
misspecification is given by: 
2 χ ) ˆ (b f
  () .   () ) ( ~ ) ˆ ( ) ˆ (
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With  and  . R




− = - is a generalised inverse of R. The degrees of 
freedom of the test is equal to the number of elements in m, i.e. n=11466, minus the number of 
parameters, i.e. k. 
 
3.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL MODELS AND MODEL SELECTION 
In the following we present several econometric models that have been dominating the literature on 
transitory and permanent wage inequality over the last two decades and assess their performance.  
A popular specification of the stochastic process of log-wages is to allow for individual differences in 
log-wages that are assumed to be constant over time, i.e. a random individual specific effect, and an 
error component that is assumed to be independently distributed across individuals but is allowed 
to correlate over time. Following MaCurdy (1982), such a structure is formalized as follows: 
(1)   it i it y ν α + = , 
where yit is the log-wage of individual i in period t (in deviation of its mean), αi is a time invariant 
individual specific effect with mean 0 and variance
2
α σ  and vit is assumed to follow an ARMA (p,q) 
process. In this model the variance of the individual specific effect,
2
α σ , is interpreted as permanent 
wage inequality and the variance of vit is interpreted as transitory wage inequality. The ARMA (p,q) 
process is formalised as follows: 










j it j m a
0 0
ε υ
where εit is assumed to be white noise, i.e. serially independently distributed error terms with mean 




, ~0 , it t iid ε ε ) σ j with a0=1 
and the moving average parameters are denoted by mj with m0=1. The parameters p and q are the 
orders of, respectively, the autoregressive and moving average process. If p and q are both zero this 
error component follows a pure white noise process. The aj and mj parameters are assumed 
constant over time. Moffitt and Gottschalk (2002) provide empirical evidence in support of this 
assumption. We follow MaCurdy (1982) and estimate the model formed by equations (1) and (2) 
using several specifications for the ARMA (p,q) structure. We choose p to be equal to 1 and increase 
q until the additional MA coefficient is insignificant. To initialise the stochastic process of vit we follow 
MaCurdy (1982, p.92/93) and assumed that the variances of the white noise ( )
2
,t ε σ  for 1974 and 
1975 are equal. As it turned out, an ARMA(1,4) structure suffices and the a1 coefficient is in every 
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model specification significantly different from -1. This result rules out the so-called unit-root model 
suggested by Abowd and Card (1989) which would require the restriction a1=-1 to hold. 
 
The goodness of fit test reported in Table 3 shows that MaCurdy’s (1982) model does not fit the 
data well. This is not a very surprising result since as is apparent from Figure 2, the variance of 
individual wages increases with age and this will not be captured by the model formulated by 
equations (1) and (2). Therefore, apart from allowing for permanent individual differences in the 
level of log-wages one may also allow for different growth rates in wages across individuals (Baker, 
1997). Such a model is referred to as a random growth rate model and can be formalized as follows: 
(3)   it it i i it A y ν λ α + + = , 
where  is the age of individual i at time t and  it A i λ  is the random growth term with mean 0 and 
variance
2
λ σ . This model is similar to the one used by Baker (1997)11 and nests the models 
advocated in the earlier studies of Lillard and Weiss (1978), MaCurdy (1982) and Abowd and Card 
(1989). Table 3 shows that the random growth model significantly improves the fit: a decrease in the 
χ2-statistics from 512051 to 212820 with just one degree of freedom less. Nevertheless, given a 
critical value of 11790 the χ2-test statistics is highly significant and, consequently, we conclude that 
the random growth model is rejected by the data. Baker (1997) reports also highly significant χ2-test 
statistics, which casts some doubt on his empirical results.  
Table 3: Model Selection.  




(1% significance level) 
MaCurdy (1982)  Equation (1)   512051 
(11433) 
11790 
Baker (1997)  Equation (3)  212820 
(11432) 
11790 
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994)  Equation (4)  200745 
(11406) 
11769 
Dickens (2000a),  
Extended Version 
Equations (5) & (6)  23316 
(11369) 
11713 
Year-Age Model  Equations (7) & (8)  18392 
(11331) 
11676 





                                                  
11   The difference with Baker (1997) is that the covariance between the individual specific effect and the random growth 
rate is set equal to zero, i.e. [] 0 = i i E λ α . Using the PSID data, Baker (1997) obtained a negative estimate of this 
covariance term. However, we find a positive estimate and, presumably due to this positive estimate of the covariance 
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Legend: The estimation results of each model are available from the authors upon request. The 
estimation results of the last model, the Year-Age-Cohort-model, are reported in Table 4. An 
ARMA(1,4) structure is used in all models. The χ2-test statistics are calculated using the optimal 
weighting matrix, i.e. we use V-1as the generalised inverse of R (see Section 3.1), and the EWMD-
estimates. 
Table 4: Estimation Results of the Year-Age-Cohort Model, equations (9) and (10) (EWMD-estimates). 
Year Effects     
Permanent Component    Transitory Component 
Parameter p.e.  s.e.    Parameter  p.e.  s.e. 
pt     
2
,t ε σ     
1975 1.000  -    1975  0.037  0.010 
1976 0.954  0.010    1976  0.042  0.013 
1977 0.915  0.010    1977  0.028  0.009 
1978 0.915  0.010    1978  0.026  0.008 
1979 0.866  0.009    1979  0.027  0.009 
1980 0.892  0.010    1980  0.026  0.009 
1981 0.988  0.011    1981  0.027  0.009 
1982 1.000  0.012    1982  0.023  0.008 
1983 0.995  0.012    1983  0.026  0.009 
1984 0.999  0.012    1984  0.026  0.010 
1985 0.992  0.012    1985  0.024  0.009 
1986 1.015  0.013    1986  0.025  0.010 
1987 1.056  0.014    1987  0.027  0.011 
1988 1.068  0.015    1988  0.033  0.013 
1989 1.088  0.016    1989  0.033  0.014 
1990 1.077  0.016    1990  0.034  0.015 
1991 1.097  0.017    1991  0.037  0.016 
1992 1.111  0.018    1992  0.035  0.016 
1993 1.132  0.019    1993  0.035  0.016 
1994 1.127  0.019    1994  0.037  0.017 
1995 1.142  0.020    1995  0.045  0.022 
1996 1.125  0.020    1996  0.045  0.022 
1997 1.094  0.019    1997  0.043  0.021 
1998 1.096  0.020    1998  0.045  0.023 
1999 1.084  0.020    1999  0.043  0.022 
2000 1.071  0.020    2000  0.042  0.022 
2001 1.114  0.022    2001  0.044  0.024 
            a1    -0.975  0.005 
            m1    -0.464  0.012 
            m2    -0.041  0.014 
            m3    -0.031  0.015 
            m4    0.016  0.010 
                                                                                                                                                      
2 2
λ σ α σ term, the estimated variances   and   turn out to be negative. For this reason we do not include the covariance 
in equation (3), in line with Dickens (2000a, p.40).  
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Age Effects             
Permanent Component    Transitory Component 
Parameter p.e.  s.e.    Parameter  p.e.  s.e. 
2
,a µ σ        q a   
21,   
2
α σ -0.003 0.001   21  1.000 - 
22 0.012  0.001    22  0.928  0.010 
23 0.010  0.001    23  0.907  0.013 
24 0.008  0.001    24  0.938  0.017 
25 0.013  0.001    25  0.874  0.020 
26 0.007  0.001    26  0.865  0.024 
27 0.007  0.001    27  0.872  0.028 
28 0.007  0.001    28  0.863  0.032 
29 0.005  0.001    29  0.880  0.036 
30 0.005  0.001    30  0.888  0.041 
31 0.003  0.001    31  0.903  0.046 
32 0.003  0.001    32  0.928  0.051 
33 0.004  0.001    33  0.938  0.056 
34 0.002  0.001    34  0.959  0.062 
35 0.002  0.001    35  0.981  0.067 
36 0.003  0.001    36  0.968  0.071 
37 0.000  0.001    37  1.011  0.079 
38 0.001  0.001    38  1.030  0.085 
39 0.000  0.001    39  1.052  0.091 
40 -0.001  0.001    40  1.077  0.098 
41 -0.001  0.001    41  1.078  0.103 
42 0.000  0.001    42  1.105  0.111 
43 0.000  0.001    43  1.093  0.115 
44 -0.002  0.001    44  1.130  0.124 
45 0.000  0.001    45  1.132  0.129 
46 -0.001  0.001    46  1.139  0.135 
47 0.001  0.001    47  1.141  0.141 
48 0.000  0.001    48  1.149  0.147 
49 -0.002  0.001    49  1.179  0.156 
50 0.003  0.001    50  1.169  0.161 
51 0.000  0.001    51  1.161  0.165 
52 0.003  0.001    52  1.141  0.168 
53 0.003  0.001    53  1.114  0.169 
54 0.001  0.001    54  1.138  0.178 
55 0.005  0.002    55  1.053  0.171 
56 0.007  0.002    56  1.022  0.171 
57 0.010  0.002    57  0.910  0.159 
58 0.006  0.002    58  0.874  0.158 
59 0.017  0.003    59  0.725  0.139 
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Cohort Effects (year of birth)   
Permanent Component    Transitory Component 
Parameter p.e.  s.e.    Parameter  p.e.  s.e. 
rc      s c   
1916-1924 1.000  -   1916-1924  1.000  - 
1925 1.032  0.019    1925  0.972  0.034 
1926 1.005  0.018    1926  0.982  0.032 
1927 1.021  0.019    1927  0.997  0.034 
1928 1.034  0.019    1928  0.997  0.036 
1929 1.066  0.019    1929  1.001  0.038 
1930 1.047  0.019    1930  1.029  0.042 
1931 1.108  0.019    1931  0.964  0.044 
1932 1.042  0.019    1932  0.991  0.047 
1933 1.031  0.020    1933  0.997  0.051 
1934 1.019  0.022    1934  1.090  0.059 
1935 1.033  0.022    1935  1.043  0.061 
1936 1.020  0.021    1936  0.994  0.063 
1937 0.956  0.021    1937  1.022  0.068 
1938 1.013  0.022    1938  1.019  0.073 
1939 1.017  0.023    1939  0.997  0.076 
1940 1.027  0.023    1940  0.989  0.080 
1941 1.004  0.024    1941  1.078  0.091 
1942 0.964  0.024    1942  1.034  0.092 
1943 1.033  0.026    1943  1.022  0.096 
1944 1.072  0.027    1944  1.033  0.102 
1945 0.986  0.026    1945  1.066  0.109 
1946 1.036  0.028    1946  1.003  0.108 
1947 1.005  0.027    1947  1.004  0.112 
1948 1.007  0.028    1948  0.977  0.114 
1949 0.982  0.029    1949  1.021  0.123 
1950 1.024  0.030    1950  0.989  0.125 
1951 1.031  0.031    1951  1.002  0.131 
1952 1.010  0.031    1952  0.973  0.132 
1953 0.967  0.032    1953  0.993  0.138 
1954 0.950  0.032    1954  1.009  0.145 
1955 0.984  0.034    1955  0.999  0.148 
1956 0.950  0.034    1956  1.030  0.157 
1957 0.982  0.035    1957  0.946  0.150 
1958 1.024  0.037    1958  0.974  0.159 
1959 0.986  0.037    1959  0.994  0.167 
1960 1.044  0.040    1960  1.052  0.181 
1961 0.967  0.038    1961  1.014  0.179 
1962 0.972  0.038    1962  1.023  0.185 
1963 1.010  0.040    1963  1.039  0.193 
1964 0.970  0.040    1964  1.062  0.201 
1965 1.006  0.042    1965  1.092  0.212 
1966 1.009  0.043    1966  1.050  0.209 
1967 0.982  0.043    1967  1.083  0.220 
1968 1.057  0.046    1968  1.050  0.219 
1969 0.995  0.045    1969  1.048  0.223 
1970 0.955  0.044    1970  0.981  0.213 
1971 0.996  0.047    1971  1.014  0.225 
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1972 0.983  0.048    1972  0.960  0.218 
1973 1.001  0.050    1973  0.925  0.214 
1974 1.028  0.058    1974  0.985  0.233 
1975 1.009  0.062    1975  0.940  0.226 
1976 1.007  0.075    1976  0.886  0.218 
1977 0.997  0.105    1977  0.901  0.226 
1978-1980 1.000  0.149    1978-1980  0.859  0.223 
 
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) discuss the idea that returns to human capital may have changed over 
time as a result of permanent shocks. The 1970’s oil shocks and skill biased technological change in 
the 1980’s and 1990’s are examples of causes of permanent shocks to individuals’ earnings. This idea 
is formalised a follows: 
 (4)    ( ) it it i i t it A p y ν λ α + + = . 
The first part in parentheses at the right hand side of equation (4) is often referred to as the 
permanent component, say the accumulated human capital, and the pt’s are the returns to these 
investments. The value of pt in 1975 is normalised to 1. The second part at the right hand side of 
equation (4) is the transitory component of earnings. An increase in pt causes a wider spread of the 
wage distribution but does not affect the ranking of individuals. In this model identification of the pt’s 
is achieved by using the covariances of log-wages over time. Without any change in the variance of 
the transitory wage component, an increase in pt decreases wage mobility, as discussed in the 
introduction. As it turns out, the model does not sufficiently explain the variance-covariance 
structure of log-wages over the observation period. As shown in Table 3, the corresponding χ2-test 
statistics is highly significant and we have to conclude that also this model is rejected by the data. 
Results not shown here (but available upon request) indicate that based on equation (4) the increase 
in permanent wage inequality is severely underestimated when compared with the increase obtained 
from the final model (underneath). Baker and Solon (2003) report a similar finding. 
 
Topel and Ward (1992) find that most wage innovations happen early in the career. A single random 
growth term may not capture this accurately12 and for this reason Dickens (2000a) further builds on 
the model proposed by Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) and allows the earnings growth rates to vary 
with age, i.e. earnings are assumed the have a random walk in age.13. Dickens’ (2000a) model is 
nested in the following one:  
(5)   it ia t it p y ν µ + = ,  
                                                  
12   Baker (1997, Appendix) experiments with Age squared and he finds that this extension only marginally improves the fit 
of the model and concludes that a linear approximation is sufficient. 
13   This model is very close to the model proposed in Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995, 2002). 
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with the random walk being specified as follows:   
(6)   ia ia ia η µ µ + = −1 ,  i i α µ = 21 ,  ( ) 21 , 0 ~
2
, > a if iid a ia η σ η . 
 
As before,  αi is a time invariant individual specific effect with mean 0 and variance
2
α σ . This 
specification allows for age specific innovations and results in an increase in the variance of the 
permanent earnings component with age in an arbitrary way, hence relaxes the linear function in age 
of the random growth model (equation (3) or (4)). Table 3 shows that this model performs 
reasonably well but the model is still rejected by the data. The improvement in the χ2-statistics is 
significant: a decrease from 200745 to 23316 with only 37 degrees of freedom less. This remarkable 
improvement in the goodness of fit strongly underlines the importance of allowing for age specific 
permanent shocks. 
 
The original model proposed by Dickens (2000a), who uses the NES data up to 1995, imposes some 
restrictions on this model: (i) an ARMA(1,2) structure instead of an ARMA(1,4) structure, (ii) age-
specific variances,  ia η , are set equal to 0 at ages over 40,  (iii) 
2
α σ  is set equal to zero at the 
youngest age (age 22 in Dickens’, 2000a, model). A joint test of these restrictions yields a rejection 
of these restrictions by the data and we therefore do not impose them on the model.  The 
restriction (iii) is, however, not rejected by the data.14 Concerning the goodness of fit test, Dickens 
(2000a, Table 2, p.38) reports a highly significant χ2-test statistic equal to 15196 with 7105 degrees 
of freedom (the critical value is equal to 7391), which already suggests some sort of misspecification 
of his model. 
 
The model as formulated in equations (5) and (6) is extended in two directions. Firstly, the 
transitory shocks in wages are allowed to differ with age. One important reason for allowing for this 
extension is that one may expect higher wage mobility earlier in an individual’s career (Topel and 
Ward, 1992) and once a career is consolidated wages are less affected by transitory wage shocks. 
This is formalised as follows: 
(7)   it a ia t it q p y ν µ + = ,  
                                                  
14   A (minor) difference between Dickens (2000a) and the model as outlined in equations (5) and (6) is that Dickens 
(2000a) formulates equation (5) as follows: it t ia t it p y ν δ µ + =
, with  it ν
following an ARMA(p,q) process as in 
equation (2) but with ( )
2 , 0 ~ ε σ ε iid t , i.e. a constant variance over time. Ramos (2003) models this part of the 
transitory component the same way we do. 
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(8)   ia ia ia η µ µ + = −1 ,  i i α µ = 21 , ( ) 21 , 0 ~
2
, > a if iid a ia η σ η . 
 
The age specific parameter qa scales the impact of transitory shocks and is normalised to 1 at age 21, 
i.e. q21=1. This model allows not only the variance of the permanent wage component to increase 
with age but also allows changes in the variance of the transitory wage component, hence provides 
more insights in how wage inequality and mobility changes with age. This model is referred to as the 
Year-Age model and Table 3 shows that the fit is improved significantly, suggesting that transitory 
shock do impact differently the wages of individuals at different ages. However, this extension is not 
sufficient for obtaining a model that passes the goodness of fit test.  
As discussed in the introduction, Blundell and Preston (1996, 1998) show the significance of cohort 
effects in the permanent variance of income: cohort entering the labour market in the late 1980’s 
face significantly higher permanent income inequality compared to the older cohorts.15 Similarly, 
Ramos (2003) concludes there is lower earnings mobility for the younger cohorts during the 1990’s. 
For this reason we extend the model as formulated above by allowing for cohort effects in the 
permanent and transitory variances of log-wages: 
(9)   it c a ia c t it s q r p y ν µ + = ,  
(10)   ia ia ia η µ µ + = −1 ,  i i α µ = 21 , ( )
2
, ~0 , ia a iid η ησ  if a>21. 
 
This model is referred to as the Year-Age-Cohort model. The advantage of modelling cohort effects 
in this multiplicative way is that it allows a cohort to have either a different return to the permanent 
component of wages (pt) or a different variation in the permanent component ( ia µ ), say because of 
differences in the skill dispersion between cohorts.16
 
Including cohort effects in this non-parametric way in both the permanent and transitory 
component of log-wages yields an unidentified model. The reason for this is that we have only one 
moment condition for men born in 1916 who are aged 59 in 1975 and one for men born in 1980 
who are aged 21 in 2001 and this makes it impossible to identify both the transitory and permanent 
variances of log-wages for these cohorts. In theory, normalising rc and sc to be equal to 1 for the 
                                                  
15   Several studies have examined cohort effects on wages and returns to schooling and experience (Welsh, 1979, 
Behrman and Birdall, 1988). For instance, Welsh (1979) examines the effects of cohort size on wages and find significant 
effects - with differences in the effects across education groups - and also shows that cohort effects decline over the 
career, suggesting that part of the cohort effects are transient. 
16   From another perspective: we cannot separately identify these two different cohort effects. 
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1916 and 1917 birth-cohorts and equalising rc’s and sc’s for the 1979 and 1980 birth-cohorts yields 
an identified model. In practice, however, we experienced several poorly determined cohort effects 
when trying to estimate all theoretically identified parameters.17 For this reason we normalise rc and 
sc to be equal to 1 for the birth-cohorts of 1916-1924, hence the cohorts entering employment 
before 1946, and equalise the rc’s and sc’s for the birth-cohorts of 1978-1980, hence the cohorts 
entering employment after 1998. 
 
Table 3 shows that the Year-Age-Cohort model passes the goodness of fit test, the improvement is 
significant suggesting that cohort effects are of major importance explaining the variance-covariance 
structure of log-wages. This will be investigated in detail in the next section. Baker and Solon (2003), 
using Canadian administrative data, estimate a model that is conceptually quite similar to ours but do 
not report a goodness of fit test statistic for their model.18 In line with our results, they do conclude 
that including cohort effects significantly improves the fit of the model explaining the variance-
covariance structure of wages and furthermore they conclude that omitting cohort effects leads to 
misleading results concerning the changes in the variances of the permanent and transitory wage 
component. This latter issue will be investigated in the next section. Ramos (2003) estimates a 
model that is more restrictive than the Year-Age-Cohort model. Apart from making additional 
assumptions on the random walk process in equation (10), in line with Baker (1997), and the birth-
cohort effects, his model does not allow the transitory shocks to differ with age. As we will show in 
the next section, this latter restriction turns out to be of crucial importance. 
 
                                                  
17   To be more precise: the standards errors corresponding to some of the cohort effects became relatively large with 
parameter estimates remaining close to 1.  
18   Baker and Solon (2003) model cohort effects differently: they allow the variances  and  , i.e. the variance of the 
random growth term of wages, and the initial transitory variance to differ by cohort. They do impose some functional 
forms such as restricting the variance of the transitory component to a polynomial in age. Our model is more flexible, 
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4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The Year-Age-Cohort model as formulated in equations (9) and (10) with an ARMA(1,4) specification 
for the stochastic process of vit is our preferred specification to analyse the changes in the variance-
covariance structure of (log-) wages over time and individuals’ lifecycle, hereby controlling for 
cohort effects in both permanent and transitory wage inequality. For the purpose of gaining insights 
in parameter estimates, we will plot the year, age and cohort profiles of the variance of (log-) wages 
and its permanent and transitory components, and we refer for the individual parameter estimates 
to Table 4.  
 
Before proceeding to the discussion of the results we like to make two remarks. Table 4 shows that 
a few of the age-specific variances of the random walk are estimated to be negative. These negative 
estimates are all insignificant and setting them equal to 0 does not change any of the results 
discussed underneath.19 The interpretation of the results before 1979 demands caution because 
MaCurdy’s ARMA(p,q) representation of the stochastic process is only a valid representation of the 
stochastic process of vit after q periods (MaCurdy, 1982, p.93). For example, the estimates of   in 
1975 and 1976 are relatively large and this may solely be the effect of the “start-up” of the 
stochastic process and will depend on the way one initialises the stochastic process (see section 





4.1 ESTIMATION RESULTS OF THE YEAR-AGE -COHORT MODEL 
Figure 4 shows the estimated variances of the transitory and permanent wage component over the 
period 1975-2001, keeping age and cohort constant (i.e. age is set equal to 40 and rb and sb are set 
equal to 1). The most striking feature of Figure 4 is that the increases in wage inequality over the 
observation period is mainly due to an increases in transitory wage inequality and only to lesser 
extent due to an increase in permanent wage inequality. This result is in line with the findings of 
Ramos (2003) and Blundell and Preston (1998, Figure V). This latter study shows a widening cap 
between the variances of household income and consumption from the early 1980’s onwards, which 
suggests a relatively stronger increase in transitory than permanent income inequality. This result is, 
however, in sharp contrast to the findings in Dickens (2000a) who concludes an equal rise in the 
permanent and transitory component of the variance of log-wage. We return to this contrasting 
finding in section 4.2. 
                                                  
19   Dickens (2000a) sets 
2
α σ  equal to zero at the youngest age for a similar reason (age 22 in his case). 
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Permanent wage inequality has increased during the 1980’s and has slightly decreased during the 
second half of the 1990’s. Nevertheless, the strong increase in transitory wage inequality results in a 
continuation of the rise in wage inequality throughout the 1990’s. This is in contrast to suggestions 
of the raw statistics shown in Table 2 and Figure 2 and underlines the importance of controlling for 
age and cohort effects. The increase in overall wage inequality has diminished in the second half of 
the 1990’s, as a result of the decrease in permanent wage inequality, but has again increased in 2001. 
The estimation results in Table 4 show that the variance of the transitory wage shock ( ) has 
remained fairly constant since 1995. This caused a slowdown in the increase in transitory wage 
inequality. The direct effect is limited because of the high degree of persistency in the transitory 
component of wages, as will be discussed below (Figure 7), but if remaining constant it will 




As discussed in the introduction, wage mobility is affected by changes in both the variances of the 
transitory and permanent component of log-wages (Moffitt and Gottschalk, 1995). To assess 
changes in wage mobility Figure 5 plots the ratio of the variances of permanent and transitory log-
wage components; perhaps better referred to as wage immobility. Figure 5 shows a decline in this 
ratio over the observation period, which suggests an increase in wage mobility. In other words, 
although there has been an increase in permanent wage inequality over the observation period the 
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probability of individuals changing ranks within the wage distribution has also increased during this 
period. In this respect we reach an opposite conclusion from Dickens’ (2000b). He concludes a 
decrease in wage mobility.20 Based on the results of Dickens (2000a) that transitory and permanent 
wage inequality rise at the same rate, one may conclude that wage mobility remained fairly constant 
from 1975 to 1995. We return to this finding in section 4.3. Ramos (2003) concludes, in line with 
our results, that wage mobility in Britain has increased during the 1990’s. 
 




To assess lifecycle inequality Figure 6 shows the variances of the transitory and permanent wage 
component over individuals’ lifecycle. For this purpose the year is set equal to 1990 and rb and sb are 
set equal to 1. Figure 6 shows that wage inequality increases over individuals’ lifecycle up to age 50 
and decreases from there on. A dominating feature of Figure 6 is the strong increase in permanent 
wage inequality up to age 36 and the relatively constant permanent wage inequality from there on a 
up to age 50. This finding is in line with Topel and Ward (1992) who find that most wage 
innovations happen early in the career. The results in Figure 6 also imply that wage mobility 
decreases dramatically with age up to age 30, remaining constant from age 30 to age 36, increases 
with age from age 36 up to age 50, and decreases with age after age 50. Furthermore it is 
noteworthy that the patterns over the lifecycle suggest that allowing variances to be a linear or 
                                                  
20 This may be caused by the fact he uses a mobility index without controlling for age and cohort effects. 
AIAS - UvA   23 Adriaan S. Kalwij & Rob Alessie 
quadratic function of age, as is sometimes suggested in the literature (Baker and Solon, 2003), may 
not be sufficient. Our findings in Figure 6 are in sharp contrast with Ramos (2003) who concludes 
that relative earnings persistence declines over the lifecycle. His result may be driven by the fact his 
model does not allow the transitory shocks to differ with age. In section 4.2 we discuss the 
consequences of this restriction. 
Figure 7 plots the permanent and transitory log-wage components for the different cohorts, i.e. at 
the year of turning 21. For this purpose age is set equal to 40 and the year is set equal to 1990. The 
most striking feature of Figure 7 is the rise in wage inequality for the cohorts entering employment 
during the 1980’s and the decrease in wage inequality for cohorts entering during the 1990’s. These 
changes are mainly due to changes in transitory wage inequality. Blundell and Preston (1998) 
conclude that the late 1980’s cohorts experience higher permanent income inequality. Apart from 
an increase in permanent wage inequality for the 1989 cohort we find little support for extending 
their findings to wage inequality. Figure 7 shows that transitory wage inequality decreases with the 
cohort for cohorts entering employment during the 1990’s, which in combination with relatively 
constant permanent wage inequality implies lower wage mobility for the younger cohorts. 
 
Figure 6: The variances of the transitory and permanent components of log-wages over individuals’ lifecycle. 
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Figure 7: The permanent and transitory components of log-wages for the different cohorts, i.e. in the calendar 
years of turning 21 years of age. 
 
 
Figure 8 plots the estimated correlation coefficient between two periods of the transitory wage 
component. The correlation coefficient is about 0.88 over one period and only very gradually 
decreases from there on, and is still 0.65 over a 10 year period and 0.30 over a 40 year period. This 
high degree of persistency is also found in Dickens (2000a). Using the income variable from the 
British Household Panel Survey, Jarvis and Jenkins (1998) reports somewhat lower “raw” 
correlation coefficients. A consequence of this high degree of persistency is that permanent wage 
inequality based on individuals’ lifetime earnings will be larger than when based on within period 
permanent wage inequality.21 The sharp increase in transitory wage inequality as shown in Figure 4 
will therefore have, from an individual’s lifecycle perspective, long-term effects. 
 
                                                  
21   Only in the case of no serial correlation there would be no difference. 
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4.2 THE EMPIRICAL IMPORTANCE OF CONTROLLING FOR COHORT EFFECTS AND 
AGE-SPECIFIC TRANSITORY WAGE INEQUALITY 
Section 3 argued, based on the goodness of fit test statistic, that controlling for cohort effects is of 
empirical importance. To assess the empirical importance we compare the main results with the 
results obtained from a model without controlling for cohort effects, i.e. equations (7) and (8). 
These comparisons are graphed in Figures 9 and 10. Ignoring cohort effects yields an 
underestimation of the rise over the years in transitory wage inequality and, consequently, an 
overestimation of the rise in permanent wage inequality (Figure 9). The same conclusion can be 
drawn when comparing lifecycle wage inequality: especially between the age of 36 and 50 permanent 
wage inequality is overestimated (Figure 10). However, ignoring cohort effects cannot fully explain 
the difference between our results and those of Dickens (2000a), as discussed in section 4.1. 
Dickens (2000a) also does not allow the transitory wage inequality to differ with age and we 
therefore also impose this restriction on our model, hence estimate equations (5) and (6) and plot 
the predicted wage inequality over time in Figure 11. Figure 11 shows that, in line Dickens (2000a), 
we would conclude that there has been an almost equal increase in the transitory and permanent 
wage inequality from 1975 to 1995 when ignoring that transitory wage inequality differs with age. In 
other words, Dickens (2000a) severely overestimates the rise in permanent wage inequality and 
underestimates the rise in transitory wage inequality. Figure 12 shows more explicitly the 
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assumption made by Dickens (2000a), Ramos (2003) and studies using U.S. data, of an age-invariant 
transitory component (the horizontal line). 
 
Figure 9: Ignoring cohort effects. The estimated variances of the transitory and permanent components of log-




Figure 10: Ignoring cohort effects. The variances of the transitory and permanent components of log-wages over 
individuals’ lifecycle.  
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Figure 11: Ignoring cohort effects and age-specific transitory wage shocks. The estimated variances of the 




Figure 12: Ignoring cohort effects and age-specific transitory wage shocks. The variances of the transitory and 
permanent components of log-wages over individuals’ lifecycle. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We examine the changes in the variances of the transitory and permanent components of the 
logarithm of gross hourly wages of British men over the years 1975-2001 and disentangle the year, 
age and cohort effects on the variance components. For this purpose we use the New Earnings 
Survey. Previous econometric models developed in the literature for analysing the variance-
covariance structure of wages (MaCurdy, 1982, Baker, 1997, Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994, Dickens, 
2000a, Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2002) do not pass a test for model misspecification. We therefore 
extend these models and allow transitory shocks to affect individual wages differently at different 
ages and, following the suggestion of Blundell and Preston (1996, 1998), Ramos (2003) and Baker 
and Solon (2003), by allowing wage inequality to vary by cohort. These two extensions turned out 
to be crucial for obtaining a model that passes the test for model misspecification and obtaining 
consistent parameter estimates. Ignoring these two extensions are shown to yield misleading 
inferences of the changes in the variances of the transitory and permanent components of the log- 
wages. 
 
Descriptive statistics show that wage inequality for British men has risen sharply during the 1980’s 
and early 1990’s and has remained constant in the second half of the 1990’s. The empirical analysis 
provide the following main insights in these trends: 
 
The increase in wage inequality from the early 1980’s onwards is caused mainly by a strong increase 
in transitory wage inequality and only to a lesser extent by an increase in the permanent wage 
inequality.  
 
The increase in transitory wage inequality continued to increase up to 2001. The increase in 
permanent wage inequality took place in the second half of the 1980’s and the first half of the 1990’s 
and even decreased in the second half of the 1990’s. 
 
The transitory component of wages is highly persistent over time: serial correlation decreases from 
0.88 over a one-year period to 0.65 over a ten-year period. Hence, the increase in transitory wage 
inequality has persistent inequality consequences from an individual’s lifecycle perspective. 
 
A strong decrease in the transitory wage inequality of the new cohorts entering employment since 
the end of the 1980’s. Permanent wage inequality varies relatively little across cohorts. 
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